I am bothered by the following question: if Socrates knew that death was evil and therefore fearful should he do what is right anyway or refrain out of fear of death? Socrates says: "But I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. " It does not seem like Socrates should care if death is good or evil as he says: "a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong - acting the part of a good man or of a bad." It would seem Socrates only discussed whether death is good or evil to amplify the wisdom of his choice - not that his choice rested upon that.
However, if death is evil should that not make a difference? Is it right to bring an evil upon one's self?
According to the Torah, it is better to live than to die in order to keep the commandments with the exception of three cases: murder, illicit sexual relations and idolatry.
The Torah could mean one of two things: 1) God commands us that at times we must do what is evil in order to live, or 2) since the entire Torah is God's command if he tells us to transgress a commandment (in order to live) that evil is in effect good. Both possibilities are problematic. The first is problematic because it is saying that God commands us to do something evil. The second is problematic because it is saying that something that is evil can also be good.
I believe that the Torah endorses the first possibility. But how can God command us to do something evil? The Torah is a highly nuanced system. The only evils one should die for are the ultimate violations of one's relationship with man and God. Murder and illicit sexual relations (rape being the highest violation) are the ultimate violation of one's relationship with one's fellow human. Idolatry is the ultimate violation of how one relates to God. Why should death not always be preferable to doing evil? I believe the answer is simple: death too is an evil. The Torah instructs us how to balance two competing evils.
David HaMelech prays (Tehillim 30): "9 Unto Thee, O LORD, did I call, and unto the LORD I made supplication:10 'What profit is there in my blood, when I go down to the pit? Shall the dust praise Thee? shall it declare Thy truth? 11 Hear, O LORD, and be gracious unto me; LORD, be Thou my helper." How different are King David and Achilles!
17 comments:
One finds oneself in a dilemma: a choice between two unsatisfactory options. When thus confronted, one must carefully examine the consequences of each action, thereby determining the one with the least repugnant consequences. When confronted with two evils, everyone knows to aim for the lesser. So I wouldn't say that the Creator commands us to choose evil so that we may live, but to choose the better.
Death is not evil. True evil is only in action and only those actions which are counter to what is real are evil; evil comes in varying degrees, and actions exist in contexts -- the context of a choice. Death is not an action, and it certainly happens. All things being equal, choosing death over life is evil because our lives were given to us by the Creator and thus our lives have places in reality. All things being equal, choosing to break Jewish law is evil because it is endorsed by the Creator, also giving it a place in reality.
When one is put in a choice between two evils, one chooses the lesser. Although one is in the end choosing evil (a consequence which would ideally never exist, e.g. being murdered), the choice of the lesser is a good choice.
Point being that when one is making a decision, one should not be concerned that "good" may not be an option, because making a good decision is always an option. We are commanded to make our decisions well.
I haven't written everything I wanted to say, but I'm tired of writing and you probably are of reading. I hope that everything I wanted to say but didn't get to is clearly implied.
I just wanted to address Matt's question directly: It seems, broadly speaking, Socrates would say that human life, although created, isn't due the degree of honour payed by the Torah. This seems a question of the same kind as that of the individual vs society. A factor that would be considered is the type of difference between a person and an animal.
Ken,
I don't understand what you mean by "those actions which are counter to what is real" - what are you referring to when you say "real" and how can a person act counter to it?
I also don't understand your direct answer to my question. What, precisely, is the honor paid by the Torah to man's life? What is the relationship of this point to individual vs. society - wouldn't this "honor" be the same in any case? What does this have to do with the difference between a person and an animal.
As is often the case, I am unable to see the implications of your concise statements. I'd appreciate your help.
To act according to what is real is to interact with things in ways that aren't counter to their nature. For instance, if one has a specially designed tool; for instance an computer, whose use is to be typed upon and interneted upon and the like; and one uses it for a non-special task; for instance, using the computer to bang upon something. In the example of the computer, the damage is clear: the computer is damaged in that it, regarding its special function, no longer works as well as it did, and the banging is damaged in that you could have used a hammer, which would have been better at banging. By using the computer as a hammer, you're acting against its nature, which in this case is that it is to be used for a specific function. But however, this isn't evil because the function of computing is imposed on the computer by man, who, not being the author of reality, can impose no true natures -- he only can only add accidental natures to new arrangements of things that already have essential natures. When the source of the nature of a thing is the Creator, that nature, by virtue of it being created by the Source of the world, is part of world, and so acting against that kind of nature (the essential nature), is an affront against God, which, although there may be other areas of damage, is the essential area of damage for those kinds of sin -- that is the damage to the soul and/or the psyche incurred by such an affront, but that which makes it a sin is not the fact that it's damaging, but that you have violated metaphysical (since the very nature of a thing can't be found in the physical) truths. For example, man has a certain nature which includes a sexual aspect. Animals also have a certain nature, which excludes being the source of gratification of man's lust. So bestiality is an action against the essential nature of things. Ya faller?
The source of the honour paid human life by the Torah is that of being a tzelem Elokim. This is part of his nature and has the ramification of honour to a person's life above that of plain justice. Socrates doesn't have that added degree of respect. He would view life as the most highly valued commodity, but still only a commodity, and so it should be sacrificed for the greater benefit.
To act according to what is real is to interact with things in ways that aren't counter to their nature. For instance, if one has a specially designed tool; for instance an computer, whose use is to be typed upon and interneted upon and the like; and one uses it for a non-special task; for instance, using the computer to bang upon something. In the example of the computer, the damage is clear: the computer is damaged in that it, regarding its special function, no longer works as well as it did, and the banging is damaged in that you could have used a hammer, which would have been better at banging. By using the computer as a hammer, you're acting against its nature, which in this case is that it is to be used for a specific function. But however, this isn't evil because the function of computing is imposed on the computer by man, who, not being the author of reality, can impose no true natures -- he only can only add accidental natures to new arrangements of things that already have essential natures. When the source of the nature of a thing is the Creator, that nature, by virtue of it being created by the Source of the world, is part of world, and so acting against that kind of nature (the essential nature), is an affront against God, which, although there may be other areas of damage, is the essential area of damage for those kinds of sin -- that is the damage to the soul and/or the psyche incurred by such an affront, but that which makes it a sin is not the fact that it's damaging, but that you have violated metaphysical (since the very nature of a thing can't be found in the physical) truths. For example, man has a certain nature which includes a sexual aspect. Animals also have a certain nature, which excludes being the source of gratification of man's lust. So bestiality is an action against the essential nature of things. Ya faller?
The source of the honour paid human life by the Torah is that of being a tzelem Elokim. This is part of his nature and has the ramification of honour to a person's life above that of plain justice. Socrates doesn't have that added degree of respect. He would view life as the most highly valued commodity, but still only a commodity, and so it should be sacrificed for the greater benefit.
I understand your answer to my second set of questions.
I mostly understand your answer to my first set of questions, but I have two questions.
1) I can see how there is no evil in acting against the nature of a computer, since its nature is accidental. But how can acting against its nature be considered acting against what is real? More precisely, how can the term "real" be applied equally to accidental natures and essential natures? If a pygmy encountered a computer in the jungle, thought it would make an excellent mouse-hunting implement, and proceeded to throw it at various jungle-mice, would you say he is acting against that which is real, since he is violating the accidental nature of the computer?
I have to go now. I'll type my second question later.
I would say that the Pygmy and that definition exist in separate realms, so that definition has no relation to the Pygmy. Thus, in effect, it's not a computer to him. This makes me wonder if when one speaks of the "degree to which something partakes of reality," he is speaking of the number and/or kind(s) of realm(s) in which that thing (of which he is speaking) exists.
I'm sorry for missing today and not calling. < >excuse< /> By the way, I'm going to be in Seattle for the next three Sundays.
Could you(s) possibly summarize what you are discussing? Preferably in one or two paragraphs (short paragraphs) and in "lashon b'nei adam". I feel kind of like Thrasymachus putting restrictions on what you can say (however, I am not a sophist - I hope).
Ken,
We look forward to your return - enjoy your stay in Seattle.
Take it away, Matt. I'll chime in if I feel misrepresented.
Here is a short summary of the primary topic:
Ken: An evil action is one which is counter to what is real.
Matt: What do you mean by "real"?
Ken: An action counter to what is real is an action which goes against the nature of the actor or against the nature of the thing acted upon. Banging something with a computer is an action contrary to the nature of the computer, which is to compute. However, such an act would not be evil since a computer's nature is artificial imposed by man, and therefore, accidental. The only true, essential nature is one imposed by the Creator. Acting against such a nature is a sin because "is an affront against God . . . that you have violated metaphysical truths" although "the essential area of damage . . . is the damage to the soul and/or the psyche incurred by such an affront."
According to you, Ken, if I bash something with a computer, I am acting contrary to its nature - contrary to reality - but if a pygmy bashes something with a computer, he is not, since the pygymy and the computer's nature exist in different realms, and to him it is not a computer.
My question is: why am I any different than the pygmy? Let's say I like bashing, but not computing, and that as far as I'm concerned, computing has no place in my life. Does this equate me with the pygmy? Can I bash with the computer without acting against its nature?
My REAL question is: according to my understanding, the terms "nature" and "definition" - and certainly "real" and "reality" - imply objectivity, since they refer to properties of the object. You acknowledge that the use of computers for computing is a matter of convention. If so, how can computing rightly be called "nature" and "real"? According to you, it seems, all of these designations only exist subjectively for each and every individual, and cannot rightly be spoken about as properties of the object.
If you'll ask, "So what? Who cares?" That brings me to my next question.
According to you, the only evil action is one which runs counter to a nature imposed upon a thing by the Creator. As an example, you mention bestiality, since human sexual pleasure is not part of the essential nature of animals.
My question is: without prophecy, is it possible to determine the essential nature of a thing? If not, then without prophecy good and evil actions practically do not exist - that seems odd. If it is possible to make such a determination, how does one do so? After all, individuals in many societies engage or used to engage in bestiality, and although you may accuse them of acting contrary to the nature of the animal, they'd simply say, "How is this any different than the computer? It's a matter of convention - in our world, animals are used to sexually please humans."
To summarize, my two questions are:
1) How can you refer to the computing of a computer as its "nature" if it is just a matter of convention, and subjective?
2) If the true nature of a thing cannot be determined without prophecy, how can ethics practically exist, and if it is possible to make such a determination, how?
1a) I believe the first question can be answered by coming to an agreement on terms. In general the term "nature" or "natural form" is reserved for the form imposed on matter by Hashem. The form imposed by man is called an "artificial form". Violating artificial forms could at best be a violation of convention - such a violation could range from morally insignificant to criminal.
1b) We need look no further than the refrain of the first chapter of B'reishit to see the significance of natural form: "vaYar E ki tov". Look a little further and we see where the problems begin. Man(kind) chooses to consume the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. He chose to heed the sophistry of the nachash to "be like god knowing good and evil".
In other words, man's focus shifted from recognizing natural forms (naming the animals) and following the natural implications of that recognition (v'lo matza eizer k'negdo) to seeking ways of imposing artificial forms onto nature. Mankind shifted from the frame of Malchut Shamayim to the frame of Malchut Adam.
Now take a look at the 30th chapter of D'varim starting with pasuk 15: "15 See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil, ... 19 I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before thee life and death, the blessing and the curse; therefore choose life, that thou mayest live, thou and thy seed;"
2) It does not seem that the Torah is instructing us on the essential nature of things. Rather, it is giving us instruction on how to lead a good life that is in line with the nature of things. Not to say that we should not seek to try and comprehend nature - we must!
Now, can man know the nature of things without prophecy? Certainly! Could ethics exist without prophecy? Yes and No.
Yes: If man can know his nature he can know what is good for man; if he knows what is good for man he can answer the question: What ought man do (or not do)?
No: even if one can come to a conception of man's nature he will be limited to making very general prescriptions. The details for living would have to be hammered out by convention. However, even if all conventions were formulated by true chakhamim one would have no guarantee that all of one's actions are being governed by chakhma and not contradicting man's nature in some way. The prophecy of Moshe Rabbeinu would seem to give us that guarantee.
Is this an absolute guarantee? I am not sure. (V'acmal!)
I hope I have achieved brevity and clarity in this comment (this is a really big topic and I haven't even scratched the surface).
To Yehudah:
1) I can understand that it is wrong to act contrary to natural forms, but you seem to imply that something is wrong with imposing artificial forms on nature, but isn't it necessary to do so? Don't we need to make tools and establish conventions? Or have I misunderstood what you've written?
2) Can you elaborate on the point you are making by citing Devarim 30:15-19?
3) I understand how we can have a system of ethics, without prophecy, based on man's nature, and I also understand the limitations of such as system. I guess I was trying to ask how to differentiate between natural and artificial form. I can think of many clear examples of each, but in certain examples - like Ken's assertion that bestiality is not part of an animal's natural form - it is hard for me to see how such a determination can be made. Now I realize that addressing this question may extend beyond the scope of this blog.
To Ken (or anyone else):
I'd like an explanation of the following: "acting against that kind of nature (the essential nature), is an affront against God, which, although there may be other areas of damage, is the essential area of damage for those kinds of sin -- that is the damage to the soul and/or the psyche incurred by such an affront, but that which makes it a sin is not the fact that it's damaging, but that you have violated metaphysical (since the very nature of a thing can't be found in the physical) truths." What is the nature of this affront - what is wrong with it? What is the damage done to the soul and/or the psyche?
I will try and take up each question separately.
In response to the first question:
1a) I do not mean to say that it is wrong to impose artificial forms on nature. But, like all good things in moderation. Fortunately, halakha provides us with a formula for moderation. I believe the halakha often reinforces this idea of not obscuring natural forms (or being overly preoccupied with artificial form) in mitzvos, such as: Shabbos, Lo t'vasheil g'di b'chaleiv imo, k'layim, etc.
b) It seems many of the sippurim in the first 11 chapters of B'reishit stress the negative aspect of man's industriousness (aside from gan eden), for example: kayin builds a city, it is Kayin's descendants who become founders of major industies, migdal bavel.
Yeah. Big topic. Matt, you're right -- what a computer is used for is really just a ubiquitous social convention. Misuse isn't a sin, but I believe in the saying "misuse is abuse," even if its not objective abuse.
Moving right along, like Yehuda said, without prophesy, you could know the nature of things in vague terms -- you could have a general idea of what things are, but you couldn't really know for sure. I think it's important to note that without intelligent design, there would be no absolute definitions of the sort that we're talking about.
Keeping on going! What is the affront? You're saying that the definition of a thing implied by your action upon it is more essential than that given by the Creator.
LAST STOP! The damage to the soul and psyche (in two parts). Part I: Ya got me. Because I have only a vague notion of the soul, I have only a vague notion of what damages it, but I have no idea how it is damaged. I dunno. I guess whatever it is, though, and if it can be damaged, it's probably damaged by a sin, though, eh? Maybe you, Matt, or someone else has an answer. It seems, generally though, that acting against the nature of particular thing in a class damages (a kind of change) that particular thing in that area of it's nature which is subject to the affront, pushing it towards the outskirts of its class, and eventually destroying that aspect of it's definition i.e. removing it from the class. The soul is the essential part of man's (capital m?) nature. Part II: Well, the psyche is part of a person's nature, so one of the ways you can act against your nature is to act against your psyche, and then that does the type of damage I explained in part I.
oh. by intelligent design, I didn't mean what people who talk about evolution mean.
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