The Republic

Today, we discussed the third reading: "The Republic". We started by giving a synopsis of our selection and dividing it into its major parts. The article on "The Republic" in Wikipedia provides the subdivisions of Cornford, Hildebrandt and Voegelin - they were very similar to our own divisions:

Prologue

I.1. 327a—328b. Descent to the Piraeus

I.2—I.5. 328b—331d. Cephalus. Justice of the Older Generation

I.6—1.9. 331e—336a. Polemarchus. Justice of the Middle Generation

I.10—1.24. 336b—354c. Thrasymachus. Justice of the Sophist

Introduction

II.1—II.10. 357a—369b. The Question: Is Justice Better than Injustice?

We, similarly, viewed the contents of Book I as a kind of prologue to the rest of the book. We gave the first three interlocutors the following characterizations:

Cephalus - the seasoned elder who claims living a just life is best but is not capable/willing/interested to give a clear definition of justice.

Polemarchus - brash youth who has not taken the time to develop his thoughts - he does not give his own opinion just the one that sounds nice to him: the opinion of Simonides.

Thrasymachus - the devil's advocate - he seems more interested in arguing than finding the truth. However, we at times share his frustration with Socrates who often seems more interested in arguing with and breaking down his opponent than actually saying something.

We also discussed the following three questions:

1) Why begin with these three interlocutors?

2) Why not just start with Glaucon and Adeimantus's question?

3) What is the significance of starting with Cephalus?

I hope in the next few posts to briefly discuss each question. If I missed any please make mention of it in the comment section.

Link to the List

This is the link to The Great Ideas Program Book List.

Death or Righteousness?

The previous post was really just a lead in to this post. Here I will attempt to give an answer to Matt's question (if only a beginning):

I am bothered by the following question: if Socrates knew that death was evil and therefore fearful should he do what is right anyway or refrain out of fear of death? Socrates says: "But I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. " It does not seem like Socrates should care if death is good or evil as he says: "a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong - acting the part of a good man or of a bad." It would seem Socrates only discussed whether death is good or evil to amplify the wisdom of his choice - not that his choice rested upon that.

However, if death is evil should that not make a difference? Is it right to bring an evil upon one's self?

According to the Torah, it is better to live than to die in order to keep the commandments with the exception of three cases: murder, illicit sexual relations and idolatry.

The Torah could mean one of two things: 1) God commands us that at times we must do what is evil in order to live, or 2) since the entire Torah is God's command if he tells us to transgress a commandment (in order to live) that evil is in effect good. Both possibilities are problematic. The first is problematic because it is saying that God commands us to do something evil. The second is problematic because it is saying that something that is evil can also be good.

I believe that the Torah endorses the first possibility. But how can God command us to do something evil? The Torah is a highly nuanced system. The only evils one should die for are the ultimate violations of one's relationship with man and God. Murder and illicit sexual relations (rape being the highest violation) are the ultimate violation of one's relationship with one's fellow human. Idolatry is the ultimate violation of how one relates to God. Why should death not always be preferable to doing evil? I believe the answer is simple: death too is an evil. The Torah instructs us how to balance two competing evils.

David HaMelech prays (Tehillim 30): "9 Unto Thee, O LORD, did I call, and unto the LORD I made supplication:10 'What profit is there in my blood, when I go down to the pit? Shall the dust praise Thee? shall it declare Thy truth? 11 Hear, O LORD, and be gracious unto me; LORD, be Thou my helper." How different are King David and Achilles!

Fear of Death as Disobedience

In the Apology, Socrates says (when he answers the charge that he should be ashamed, for living "a course of life which [was] likely to bring [him] to an untimely end):

"If, I say, now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfill the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death: then I should be fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For this fear of death is indeed the pretense of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being the appearance of knowing the unknown; since no one knows whether death, which they in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is there not here conceit of knowledge, which is a disgraceful sort of ignorance? "

Is Socrates' point that he would not disobey God out of fear of death since he does not know whether death is good or bad? Or, does he mean that the disobedience would be in fearing death: since that would be a pretense of wisdom? It seems he is making both points.

Two Levels of Vindication

The following post is based on the "great discussion" had today about Plato's Apology. Hopefully, we will be able to continue our discussion in this virtual space while we are not able to meet in real space.

The Apology of Plato presents Socrates' defense against the charges of the people of Athens. He defends his actions on the grounds that he only acted out of righteousness. His mission was righteous and he felt no shame in doing everything in his power to fulfill that mission even if it provoked or angered many. I wanted to focus on two curious elements of this dialogue: 1) At the end of his defense Socrates offers us an explanation of why he pursued "a course of life which [was] likely to bring [him] to an untimely death". Why did Socrates feel it was necessary to address this issue? 2) After the sentence was delivered Socrates speaks with those "who would have acquitted" him to reflect on what just happened and he tries to prove to them that death is good. Why did he address this issue?

To answers these questions we must first understand that the Apology is not just a transcript of Socrates' defense. Plato has a greater purpose in mind: the complete vindication of Socrates.

This vindication occurs on two levels. The first is the most basic: showing that everything Socrates did was righteous - this is accomplished in Socrates' response to his earlier accusers and to the group led by Meletus. The second vindication is as follows: one might question the wisdom of Socrates' life based on his end. Perhaps, one might think, it is not good to be a "gadfly", constantly "arousing and persuading and reproaching" - one only has to look at what happened: he was killed! Could an action which leads to one's death be good? The answer is most assuredly: yes! As Socrates says: "a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong - acting the part of a good man or of a bad." The Apology is not just a transcript of Socrates' defense - it is Plato's complete vindication of Socrates' life. Now, the answer to the first two questions is clear: Socrates' discussions of death are included in order to achieve the true purpose of the Apology.